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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JIM FISHER, for and on behalf of
himself and other persons similarly
situated '
. . s-Respon d ents,
Plazntiff
vs.
LYNN J. MARSH, Salt Lake City
Personnel Director, GRANT 'VALKER, Chief, Salt Lake City Fire Department, SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation, by and through its Honorable Board of City Commissioners, J.
BRACKEN LEE, CONRAD B.
HARRISON, E. J. GARN, J A:1IES
L. BARKER, JR., and GEORGE ll.
CATMULL,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
12034

Brief of Defendants - Appellants
NATURE OF THE CASE
Salt Lake City, as defendant-appellant, seeks to
have this Court affirm the power of Salt Lake City's
legislative body to make investigations concerning the
1

advisability or necessity of contemplated legislation.
Also, it is an appeal to interpret the State Public Officers' and Employees' Ethics Act to hold that the statute
creates duties and standards of conduct for municipal
and state employees, rather than barring government
inquiry into possible conflicts of interest.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court issued a permanent injunction that barred the Salt Lake City Commission
and all City departments from requiring firemen to answer questions concerning their outside employment, including the hours per day and per week they are thus
employed, and if their outside employer does business
with Salt Lake City. Judge Gordon R. Hall held such
questions were illegal in light of the Public Officers·
and Employees' Ethics Act and, further, held that Salt
Lake City has no power to determine conflicts of interest as contemplated by that Act.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-appellant seeks to have this Court
reverse the lower court, dissolve the Restraining Order
and hold that the Salt Lake City Commission may require Salt Lake City firemen to answer questions concerning their outside employment.
2

FACTS
Prior to October 26, 1969, members of the Board
of the Salt Lake City Commission had become concerned about the hours and type of outside employment
in which the City's employees were engaged. It was
feared that some types of outside employment may interfere with the fidelity of an employee's discharge of
his City duties and with his physical ability to perform
those duties. (R-25 and 26) The City Commission passed
a motion made by Commissioner George B. Catmull
wherein the City Personnel Department was directed to
prepare a questionnaire which would ask City employees
to inform the City: (a) for whom they were employed
outside of their City jobs, (b) the hours spent in such
work, and ( c) such other information as deemed necessary to evaluate their job performance. (R-27 and 29)
The City Commission and the Fire Chief desired
this information to determine if new laws and ordinances were needed to control or bar outside employment; further, the information was needed to discover
actual or potential conflicts of interest which may have
required shifting of job assignments or other appropriate City response. (R-26) This information was particularly important in the Fire Department because here
the men are subject to call 24 hours per day and must be
physically and mentally able to carry out emergency
duty. ( R-20, 21 and 7 4) Also, the Fire Department must
inspect business establishments for fire hazards. (R20 and 21) Since some of the businesses may employ
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the very firemen who may be called upon to conduct inspections, the Fire Chief would pref er to assign firemen
not employed by that particular business to make the
inspection. (R-21).
Pursuant to the City Co1mnission's directive of October 26, 1969, Mr. Lynn J. Marsh, the Personnel Director of Salt Lake City, prepared a questionnaire asking the following questions to be answered by City employees, including the plaintiff-respondent, to-wit:
(a) The name and address of any outside employer;
(b) The hours per day and per week worked at
this outside job;
( c) The type of work performed; and
( d) If the outside employer did business with
Salt Lake City. (R-32)
Along with this questionnaire he enclosed a cover
letter dated December 2, 1969. (R-29) This letter informed the employees of some of the duties created by
the State Legislature in the Public Officers' and Employees' Ethics Act. It also informed them that statements made in response to the questionnaire may incriminate them and subject them to negative criminal
sanctions. (R-29 and 31)
The plaintiff-respondent objected to answering
this questionnaire on behalf of himself and the Firefighters' Union of which he was the President. ( R-78)
A Complaint was filed and Temporary Restraining
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Order signed by Judge Merrill C. Faux of the Third
District Court. (R-1 and 8) Thereafter, a Preliminary
Injunction Order was signed by Judge Gordon R.
Hall, after a hearing on the Temporary Restraining
Order held January 8, 1970. (R-15) Both parties moved for a Summary Judgment following a j oinder of the
issues and argument was heard February 16, 1970.
( R-33, 35 and 50)
On March 3, 1970, Judge Gordon R. Hall issued a
Memorandum Decision which held that the questionnaire was " . . . illegal, unreasonable and invalid when
viewed in light of 67-16-11, U.C.A., 1953, as amended" and further held that the City " . . . has no power
to determine the conflict of interest as contemplated by
said statute." ( R-50) He, however, expressly exempted
from his Memorandum Decision any inference that he
purported to limit or determine Salt Lake City's " ...
authority to qualify its employees for suitability for
employment, or otherwise, control, regulate or supervise them." In spite of this express caveat, the Judge
signed a Permanent Injunction Order and Judgment
barring the defendant-appellant from requiring the
firemen to answer the questionnaire and, further, from
promulgating the said type of questionnaire. (R-63)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LEGISLATIVE BODY OF SALT
LAKE CITY HAS STATUTORY AND IN5

HERENT POWERS OF INVESTIGATION
EN ABLING IT TO REQUIRE ITS EMPLOYEES TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS, THE
ANSWERS TO \VHICH ARE RELEVANT TO
CITY INTERESTS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION.
The law is now well settled that the legislative
branch of government has inherent powers of investigation in areas where it may potentially legislate or
appropriate. Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109, 3 L.Ed.
2d 1115 ( 1959) . The power of inquiry is viewed as an
important, if not the most important, function of the
legislative branch of government. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927); Woodrow
Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 303 ( 1885).
This power of investigation not only extends to
Congress and the States, but to the cities as well. This
point was clearly stated by the Tennessee Supreme
Court:
"\Ve think that a municipality has the inherent authority to investigate the activities of its
several departments and employees." Leahy v.
City of Knoxville, 193 Tenn. 242, 245 S.W.2d
772, 773 ( 1951); See also, Eggers v. Kenny, 15
N .J. 107, 104 A.2d 10 ( 1954) ; Dubois v. Gibbon.Y, 2 Ill.2d 392, 118 N.E. 2d 295 (1954); 42
C.J.S., Municipal Corp. §385 n. 14.
Although there is no case decided in Utah on this
point, it is apparent that Utah follows this rule. Statutorily, cities have been given powers which are based
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upon recognition of the fact that their legislative bodies
have investigatorial powers. For example, among others, city commissions in Utah have power to:
a. ". . . to enforce the attendance of witnesses,
production of books and papers, . . ." 10-6-13
Utah Code Ann. (1953).
b. ". . . see that the laws and ordinances are
faithfully executed." 10-6-16 Utah Code Ann.
( 1953) . (Emphasis added.)
c. " . . . examine the books, records and pap-

ers of any officer or agent employed by the city."

10-6-16 Utah Code Ann. (1953). (Emphasis
added.)
d. Hire employees, legislate and, more particularly, " . . . to create, support, maintain and
control the fire department." 10-6-61 Utah Code
Ann. ( 1953) . (Emphasis added.)
e. ". . . prescribe duties, rules and regulations
for the government . . . (of the fire department), with such penalty as they deem proper
... " 10-8-55 Code Code Ann. ( 1953) .
Further, it is to be noted that in general " . . . the city
may impose any reasonable condition upon holding off ice within its control." Leahy v. City of Knoxville, 193
Tenn. 242, 245 S.,V.2d. 772, 773 ( 1951), citing McAuliffe v. Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
Also this Court has held that cities have those powers
delegated to it by State law or those necessarily or fairly
implied from the powers expressly granted, together
with those powers essential to the declared objects and
purposes of the City. Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 7
Ut.2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957).

7

Therefore, it has been clearly stated by the Legislature that it is the City's legislative duty to conduct investigations of its employees and City business and, if
necessary, to subpoena records. Also, the City Commission has the duty to see that laws are faithfully executed and to pass laws and regulations for the efficient
operation of the Fire Department. Further, the City
has the duty to control and supervise its employees by
imposing reasonable conditions over them to guarantee
that the City's affairs are faithfully executed. Thus, the
City can and, in fact, has the duty to inquire and investigate into the outside employment practices of its
employees - including the Fire Department employees.
This conclusion is further supported by the undisputed facts which show that Salt Lake City's legislative
body desires the information contained in the questionnaire, among others, to:
1. Evaluate employee performance with reference to their outside employment.
2. Obtain background concerning outside employment practices of employees for the purpose
of formulating laws, regulations and ordinances
for regulating outside employment. (R-25, 26
and 29)

Plaintiff-respondent would argue that the questionnaire's sole purpose is to discover conflicts of interest. It was apparently upon this basis that the lower
court issued the Injunction ruling the questionnaire in
conflict with the Public Officers' and Employees'
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Ethics Act. (R-51) This position, however, is obviously
and patently false. How could the number of hours
worked per day and per week on an outside job or the
address of such outside employer have any relevance to
a conflict of interest? Obviously, these questions have
relevance only for determining if such outside employment is unduly demanding of the firemen, if the location of such employment is not in harmony with a 24hour duty call and if the employer is a business which
the firemen may be called upon to inspect for fire hazards. See, R-21. This last observation may be called a
"conflict," but it is certainly not the type contemplated
by the Ethics Act. These factors are merely matters
of Fire Department operation, control and City legislative policy.
Therefore, it is obvious that one reason for the
questionnaire is to inform the City Commission in order
that it can intelligently act in controlling or prohibiting
outside employment. The responses to the questionnaire
subject of this dispute would enable the Commission
and the Fire Chief to evaluate employee performance
in light of outside jobs to see if ordinances or regulations concerning outside employment are desirable or
necessary. Further, it will enable the Chief to make fireinspection assignments without questions concerning
the veracity of the report.

It is now well settled that a municipal corporation
can absolutely prohibit outside employment of Fire Department personnel. As was noted by the Iowa Supreme
9

Court when it upheld an ordinance prohibiting outside
employment of Police and Fire Department personnel:
"The purpose of this provision is apparently
to insure that the police officers will not have
divided loyalties as between their public and private employers; that they will be available in
case of emergencies as the ordinance requires,
even when they are off duty; and that they will
be in condition, both physical and mental, to perform their official functions when and as they
should. A policeman who has worked for several
hours at manual labor for a private employer
may not be as efficient or alert in attending to
the matters required of him as a peace officer."
Jurgens v. Davenport Railway, 88 N.W.2d 797,
801 (Iowa 1958) . See also, cases cited at 88
A.L.R. 2d 1235 et seq.
Since the City can bar the practice of outside employment in total, it can certainly investigate into this
area and require employee response to the questionnaire
in order that it can evaluate if such a bar or a lesser
control is necessary.
One has privileges and rights, including the right
to be idle, which one waives by the implied terms of employment. The right not to answer the items in the
questionnaire subject of this lawsuit is in that category.
The questions required to be answered are within those
areas in which the City has the privilege and statutory
duty to legislate, appropriate, regulate and control.
Therefore, the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City has the right and power to demand answers to the
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disputed questionnaire, outside of any consideration of
Conflicts of Interest.
The lower court Judge recognized this fact in his
Memorandum Decision. He stated:
.
"That this ruling in no way purports to determine or limit the defendants' authority to
qualify its employees for suitability for employment, or otherwise, control, regulate or supervise
them." (R-51)
However, in spite of this caveat, the lower court still
issued a Judgment and a Permanent Injunction Order
stating:
"That the 'conflict of interest' questionnaire
promulgated by defendants is illegal, unreasonable and invalid in light of 67-16-ll Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, and the def endants have no power to determine 'conflict of interest' contemplated by said Statute, . . ."
(R-63)

The only apparent explanation for this inconsistent position is that the questionnaire was entitled "Conflict of Interest" and the cover letter of December 2,
1969, referred to the Ethics Act. These facts seem to
have influenced the Judge to view this questionnaire
solely, a discovery method to uncover conflicts of interest as contemplated by the Ethics Act. However, the
uncontroverted evidence is that there were several reasons for the questionnaire, chief of which was a legislative investigation to determine if the Salt Lake City
Commission should bar or control outside employment
11

of City personnel. See discussion supra and Affidavits
at R-20 through 32. Further, with reference to the
Fire Department, the information was needed for intelligent job assignments by the Fire Chief. See discussion supra.
Also, it is important to note that Mr. Lynn J .
.Marsh viewed his cover letter of December 2, 1969, as
chiefly informative. ( R-29) The employees were notified of the standards created by the Ethics Act, since
answers to the questionnaire may have been self-incriminatory and subjected the employees to negative criminal
sanctions. It is the writer's opinion that a municipal officer asking such questions, which may tend to incriminate someone, owed to the respondents of that questionnaire a duty to thus inform them. cf. Intent, reasoning and purpose of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
Therefore, the lower court either must have disregarded the City's Affidavits or chosen to disbelieve
them; otherwise its own caveat would have demanded a
Judgment in the City's favor. On a Summary Judgment, however, all of the evidence presented must be accepted as true, leaving no germane material issue of
fact. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In this
case both parties moved for a Summary Judgment,
thereby admitting that all material facts were before
the court leaving no genuine issue of fact. (R-33
through 36)
Thus, for the purpose of the Summary Judgment
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Motion, all of the evidence and affidavits must be accepted at face value thereby leaving no issue of material
fact unresolved. Indeed, no evidence could be submitted
at anytime to change the facts contained in the affidavits on file and the case is ripe for a determination.
It fallows therefrom that the City's affidavits are uncontroverted and cannot be ignored nor disbelieved in
this Summary Judgment determination.
Therefore, even accepting arguendo plaintiff-respondent' s position that the City cannot determine conflicts of interest under the Ethics Act, the City can investigate and require answers to the questionnaire regarding those matters relevant to investigating the need
of barring and controlling outside employment. Clearly, if a City has two reasons for acting, one underpinned
in the police power and one by its inherent legislative
investigatorial power, and one power is not sufficient
to act, the other is not diminished. As was observed by
McQuillin:
". . . where the particular power is clearly
conferred, or is fairly included in or inferable
from other powers expressly conferred, and is
consistent with the purposes of the municipality
and the powers expressly conferred, the exercise of the power should be resolved in favor of
the city so as to enable it to perform its proper
functions of government." McQuillin, 2 Municipal Corporatiom, §10.21; see cases therein cited.
As is apparent, the questionnaire subject of this suit
asks questions necessary for the City to fulfill its legis-

13

lative duty. Certainly a ruling reqmrmg answers to
these types of questions is subject to an individual's
right not to make incriminating statements as protected
by the Fifth Amendment. However, this privilege
against self-incrimination is a personal one and cannot
be claimed by the plaintiff-respondent for anyone but
himself. Rogers v. U.S., 340 U.S. 367, 95 L.Ed. 344
(1951).
In view of the foregoing, the lower court should be
reversed and the Injunction Order removed on the basis
that the City Commission has inherent legislative investigatorial powers. This questionnaire is clearly within the
scope of
duties and powers, outside of any conflictof-interest issue. The City can and must be sustained in
its ability to investigate into those matters relevant to
City legislative policy and employee control.
POINT II
THE PUBLIC OFFICERS' AND EMPLOYEES' ETHICS ACT DOES NOT PURPORT OR
ATTEMPT TO SUPERCEDE OR BAR INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
BY THEIR EMPLOYER NOR DOES IT BAR
QUESTIONS ASKED O:F EMPLOYEES ABOUT THEIR OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT.
The plaintiff-respondent in his Complaint alleged
as follows:
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"That the Salt Lake City Commission does
not have the power to determine the question of
conflict of interest regarding these plaintiffs inasmuch as the Salt Lake City Civil Service
Commission, exclusively, has the power to investigate, file and process charges against these
plaintiffs." (R-3).
The lower court apparently was referring to this allegation when it held the City has ". . . no power to determine conflicts of interest . . ." ( R-50) This complaint
allegation and judicial ruling are patently incorrect.
The Ethics Act in Section 67-16-12 Utah Code Ann.
( 1953) , as amended, provides as follows:
"In addition to any penalty contained in any
other provision of law, any public officer or public employee who knowingly and intentionally
violates this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor

and shall be dwmissed from employment or removed from office as provided by law." (Em-

phasis added.)

Since a violation of the Act is a misdemeanor, any citizen, as well as the Salt Lake City Police Department,
can "determine" a violation and make an arrest for an
infraction committed in their presence. 77-13-3 and 4
Utah Code Ann. ( 1953) . In fact, the City Commission
has a statutory duty to see that laws and ordinances are
faithfully
Also, the City Police have specifically been given the responsibility to "detect" crime.
10-6-66 Utah Code Ann. (1953). Further, it is to be
noted that 10-10-21 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides:
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''All persons in the clMsified civil service may
be removed from office or employment by the
head of the department for misconduct, incompetency or failure to perform his duties or failure to observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the aggrieved
party to the civil service commission. Any person
discharged may within five days from the issuing
by the head of the department of the order discharging him appeal therefrom to the civil service commission, which shall fully hear and determine the matter. The discharged person shall
be entitled to appear in person and to have counsel and a public hearing. The finding and decision of the civil service commission upon such
hearing shall be certified to the head of the department from whose order the appeal is taken,
and shall be final, and shall forthwith be enforced and followed by him." (Emphasis added.)
Even a cursory reading of that section shows the head
of the Fire Department controls the discipline, including discharge, and not the Civil Service Commission
as alleged in plaintiff-respondent's Complaint. See also,
10-6-4 Utah Code Ann. ( 1953); V etterli v. Civil
Service Commission, 106 Ut. 83, 145 P.2d 792 (1944).
The Civil Service Commission's function is solely one of
appeal and review; its jurisdiction is not to investigate
infractions of law, file and process charges. 10-10-9 et
seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953).
Clearly, the City has the power and duty to investigate violations of the Ethics Act, and the lower
court's contrary holding should be reversed. To rule
otherwise would leave the power and duty of uncovering
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violations of criminal law in the hands of a non-existent
entity. If the City Commission and its police Department have no power - no one else does either.
As to the second holding of the lower court that
Section 67-16-11 Utah Code Ann. ( 1953), as amended, makes the questionnaire "illegal unreasonable and
invalid," it is imperative that the Court also reverse this
ruling.
The plaintiff-respondent would have the Court
believe that the Ethics Act creates an exclusive duty in
the employee to volunteer his own breach of the law and,
further, that the body politic and the City are at the employee's mercy for voluntary disclosure. In a nutshell
he argues that the questionnaire is entitled a "conflict
of interest" questionnaire and falls within the purview
and scope of the Ethics Act; therefore, since the Ethics
Act contains no provision for investigations, the inherent and statutory powers of the City to determine
violation of criminal law and control employees is superceded by the provision of Section 67-16-11 Utah
Code Ann. ( 1953) , as amended. ( R-3) The lower court's
ruling, which upholds this interpretation of the Ethics
Act and which voids the City's power of criminal investigation and employee control, is catastrophic. Not
only does it bar the questionnaire in this action but is
the basis for voiding every law passed prior to 1969
which deals with a subject even vaguely referred to
in the Act.
For example, counsel for plaintiff-respondent has
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already urged that the Ethics Act has repealed and
superceded a City ordinance of similar import to the
Federal Hatch Act, barring certain types of political
activity by civil service employees. See, U-1-5, Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah ( 1965). His argument is that since Section 67 -16-5 of the Ethics Act
exempts certain political contributions from creating
a conflict of interest for a governmental employee, the
City ordinance which bars civil service employees from
soliciting funds for and being directly involved in
a political campaign as superceded by the provisions
of Section 67-16-11 of the Ethics Act. In the matter of the discharge of Jim Fisher, before the Salt
Lake City Civil Service Commission, Appellant's motion to Dismiss, p.
( 1970). The basic legal position
of this case and the one before the bar are the same;
that is, does Section 67-16-11 of the Ethics Act repeal every law passed prior to 1969? If plaintiffrespondent's position is accepted, what other laws
are to be repealed by the Ethics Act can only be limited
by the inventiveness of counsel in reading what subjects
are mentioned in provisions of the Ethics Act. It is
respectfully submitted that no such strained literalness
must be applied to Section 67-16-11 of the Ethics Act.
Indeed, the cannons of statutory construction militate
against such an interpretation.
The law of statutory construction is well settled
that the intent and purpose of a piece of legislation
controls its construction. The courts must construe the
Act to achieve the purpose of the legislative body. This
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rule was articulately stated by Lord Coke as early as
1584; he stated:
"And it was resolved by them, that for the full
and true interpretation of all statutes in general
(be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to
be discerned and considered: - 1st. What was
the common law before the making of the act ?
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which
the common law did not provide? 3rd. What
remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth? 4th.
The true reason of the remedy. And then the
office of all the iudges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle invention and evasions for continuance of the mischief,
and pro privato commodo, and to add force to the
cure and remedy, according to the true intent of
the makers of the act pro bona publico." Heyden' s Case, 3 Co. Rep. 72, 76 Eng. Repr. 637
( 1584), cited in 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, (3rd Ed. 1943), §4501 p. 314 (Emphasis added. )
This Court correctly has adopted this rule and in
Young v. Barney stated:
"In any inquiry concerning the application of
a rule or a statute to a given situation the primary
objective is to discover the intent and purpose
for which it was enacted." Young v. Barney, 20
Ut.2d 108, 433 P.2d 846, 847 (1967).
The purpose and intent of the Ethics Act is not
really in question. One could point to the title to assist
in the interpretation and application of the Act. Young
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v. Barney, supra. However, in the case before the bar,
that process of deduction is not necessary because the
Legislature prefaced the Act and clearly stated its policy
and purpose. It said:
"The purpose of this act is to set forth standards of conduct for officers and employees of the
state of Utah and its political subdivisions in
areas where there are actual or potential conflicts
of interest between their public duties and their
private interests. In this manner the legislature
intends to promote the public interest and
strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of Utah in the integrity of their government.
It does not intend to deny any public officer or
employee the opportunities available to all other
citizens of the state to acquire private economic
or other interests so long as this does not interfere with his full and faithful discharge of his
public duties." 67-16-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953),
as amended. (Emphasis added.)
The whole legislative enactment deals with duties and
standards of conduct for governmental employees. For
example:
(a) See, 76-16-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as
amended, dealing with employees securing privileges from outside employment or discharging
confidential information;
(b) See, 07-16-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953),
which prohibits the acceptance of certain gifts or
loans which may influence official action or decision;
(c) See, 67-16-6 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as
amended, which prohibits employees from as- '
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sisting, for consideration, any person in transacting business with the State without a disclosure
by the employee outlined in the statute;
(d) See, 67-16-7 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as
amended, requiring employee disclosure of his
outside employment by a business regulated by
the government unit employing him;
(e) See, 61-16-8 Utah Code Ann. (1953),
barring an employee from receiving consideration in a transaction between the employing governmental unit and the business entity in which
he is an officer, director or holds a substantial
interest;
(f) See, 67-16-9 Utah Code Ann. (1953),
banning personal investment which creates a
substantial conflict of interest.
Each of the sections, in fact, does exactly what the
Act declared to be its purpose: " ... to set forth standards of conduct for officers and employees ... "
Thus, it is apparent that the "disease of the commonwealth" that was to be corrected by the Ethics
Act was the feared misconduct on the part of public
employees. Therefore, construction of this Act should
further the purpose and intent of establishing standards so that public confidence in government integrity
may be enhanced.
The section upon which the lower court ruled
and asserts repeals all powers of the City to investigate
violations of the standards of the Act, states as follows:
" . . . shall be exclusively applicable to all public officers and employees and shall supersede the
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provisions of any 8uch other law, charter or ordinance." 67-16-11 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as
amended. (Emphasis added.)
A strained, isolated, literal reading of that section
may support the lower court's reading of it. However,
again the law of statutory construction requires that
whole act be considered as a unit. Regarding this point,
Sutherland stated:
"The practical inquiry in litigation is usually
to determine what a particular provision, clause,
or word means. To answer it one must proceed as
he would with any other composition - construe
it with reference to the leading idea or purpose
of the whole instrument. A statute is passed as
a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed
in connection with every other part or section so
as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not
proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed." 2 Sutherland Statutory
Construction, (3rd Ed. 1943), §4703, p. 336.

It was further observed that:
"A statute is to be construed with reference
to its manifest object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will
carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction."
2 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3rd Ed.
1943), §4704, p. 338, citing In re National Guard,
71 Vt. 493, 45 Atl. 1051 ( 1889).
Reading the Act as a whole and prefaced as it is with
a definite legislative purpose, Section 67 -16-11 must be
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read as superce<ling only those City laws and ordinances
establishing conflicting Standards of Conduct for governmental employees. It does not and cannot be read to
prohibit investigation of infractions of these standards
nor to void every ordinance, law or act dealing with
a subject mentioned in the Ethics Act. To do so would
make the whole Act, together with its purpose and
intent, a nullity.
This interpretation of Section 67-16-11 of the
Ethics Act, limiting its scope to standards of ethical
government employment, is further supported by the
very limited wording of that section. It is important
to note that the application of 67-16-11 is limited by
the phrase "such other law, charter or ordinance."
Every word in a statute is presumed to have been placed
in the law for a purpose and must be given meaning.
Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 7 Ut.2d 28, 317 P.2d 597
( 1957). Therefore, that phrase must be read as limiting the Section's application to superceding other laws
which establish Standards of Ethical Conduct.
A ruling by this Court upholding the lower court's
holding would have the disastrous effect of leaving the
Ethics Act with no way to enforce the criminal and
civil sanctions contained in it; thus, such a ruling would
in effect void parts of the Act and make it internally
inconsistent. Further, such a ruling would completely
read out of Section 67-16-11 the phrase "such ot4er
law, charter or ordinance." In addition, Section 6716-11 would become a vehicle for voiding every law,
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ordinance or executive decision remotely related to
a subject made a duty of ethical conduct by the Act.
Thus, the standards created by the Act would have
no meaning and public confidence in government would
be detrimentally affected. The standards of the Act
would be exclusive and absolutely unenforceable. Voluntary disclosure by the public employee would be the
only method of discovering conflicts of interest, and
the power of legislative control over employees working
conditions and job assignments would be taken from
the City Commission.
Clearly, these results would be in conflict with the
purpose, contemplation and intent of the Utah State
Legislature. They specifically imposed a duty of disclosure upon public employees in only two sections of
that act but provided negative sanctions for violations
of any provision of it, in addition to the sanctions of
any other applicable law. See, 67-16-6, 67-16-7; cf.
67-16-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. It is
respectfully submitted that because disclosure in certain
situations is made a standard for ethical public employment, that fact should not bar governmental inquiry
and investigation to discover other violations of that
Act; further, it should not bar discovery of matters
involving City Government and control of employees
wholly unrelated to ethical conduct. This Court should
construe Section 67-16-11 to harmonize with the obvious
purpose and intent of the Ethics Act as a whole and
hold the City may investigate and inquire of its employees, among other things, information concerning
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conflicts of interest contemplated by the Ethics Act,
limited only by an individual's Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination.

CONCLUSION
Salt Lake City, as a municipal corporation of the
State of Utah, is vested with powers of control, regulation and supervision of its employees, including the
Fire Department. Among its powers, it has the
right to prohibit outside employment by members o\
the Fire Department. Also, among its statutory and
inherent powers is the right to investigate areas in
which it has the power to legislate or appropriate.
Therefore, the questionnaire subject of this lawsuit
is a proper and lawful exercise of the City's inquiry
power into areas in which it may legislate and control.
In addition to the City's interest in the effect of
outside employment on the efficiency and effectiveness
of the City employees, it is interested in avoiding and
discovering conflicts of interest. The Public Officers'
and Employees' Ethics Act has, by State legislative
fiat, established the Standards of Conduct required
of employees. However, the Act in no way interferes
with private inquiry and investigation to discover
breaches of these standards. Further, the City is free
to make inquiry into actual or potential conflicts, which
do not constitute a violation of the Act, for purposes
of making employee job assignments.
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Therefore, the questionnaire subject matter is
proper and within the exclusive prerogative of the City.
The Court should reverse the lower court, dissolve the
Permanent Injunction Order and rule as a matter of
law that the defendant-appellant may require Fire
Department employees to answer the questionnaire
which is the basis of this dispute, subject only to an
employee's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK L. CRELLIN
Salt Lake City Attorney
Roger F. Cutler
Assistant City Attorney
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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